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Insurgency-informed governance in the North Caucasus: observations from Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria

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ABSTRACT

In this article we analyse the dynamics of the insurgencies and the corresponding counter-insurgency measures in the North Caucasus over the past 25 years. By comparing three cases – Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria – we identify similarities and differences in the way insurgencies and counter-insurgency measures influence governance in the region. Analysing different dynamics and outcomes under similar framework conditions – a federal state with a centralised government trying to govern a region with a shared history of rebellions against central rule and with similar geographic, social, and cultural features facilitating resistance and insurgencies – is a promising approach to better understanding conditions and implications of insurgency-induced governance in post-Soviet Russia.

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Introduction

In this article we analyse the dynamics of the insurgencies and counter-insurgency measures in the North Caucasus over the past 25 years. By comparing three cases – Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria – we identify similarities and differences in the way insurgency and counter-insurgency governance emerges and establishes itself.

The three republics share a number of relevant features. In administrative terms all three are products of Stalin’s nationality politics and the resulting ethno-territorial division of the North Caucasus within the confines of the USSR.
Despite the same administrative status within the Russian Federation, and similar geographical and cultural-historical features, the three republics developed in very different ways with regard to the extent, intensity, and organisation of the insurgency against Moscow’s central rule.

We use the methodological approach of institution-centred conflict research to assess the reasons for different dynamics and outcomes of the insurgency in the North Caucasus. Institution-centred conflict research analyses social structures and dynamics by looking at actors involved in conflict, at resources used or sought after by actors, and at institutions shaping and constraining actors’ choices in conflicts.

We use the analytical perspectives on actors, resources, and institutions to compare the three cases under scrutiny. Before we turn to the case studies, we introduce recent trends in the general discussion of insurgency governance and counter-insurgency strategies, and highlight some specifics of this discussion in the North Caucasus.

Drivers of insurgencies: the greed of elites and the grievances of the population?

The two dominant theoretical explanations about what drives insurgencies, and subsequently the more pragmatic ideas of how to counter and stop them most effectively, have been termed the population-centred or hearts-and-minds approach and the leader-centred or cost–benefit approach.

Put in simple terms, the population-centred view on insurgencies is built around the idea that economic, social, or political grievances drive insurgencies. They can be stopped by addressing those grievances, thereby ‘winning the hearts and minds’ of the people. There is some discussion about what
grievances have priority (insecurity, bad governance, and lack of development are the usual suspects), but the main concept is the same.4

The cost–benefit view shifts the focus from the grievances of the wider population to the incentives of influential leaders.5 The idea here is that people do not rebel because they have grievances, but people rebel because political leaders have an interest in rebelling and have the capabilities and resources to organise an insurgency. Grievances may make this task easier, but they are not the main driver for insurgencies. Based on this model, insurgencies are best countered by targeting the cost–benefit calculations of those leaders rather than focusing resources on the population at large.6

The theoretical perspective on the drivers of insurgencies against states informs, among other factors,7 the counter-insurgency strategy a state may take. From the perspective of governments confronting an armed societal rather than state organisation, it makes a great difference if they conceive of this as a counter-insurgency task, or rather as a ‘global war on terror’ (United States) or ‘counter-terrorist operation’ (Russia).8 One difference rests in the definition of achievable goals. Under normal circumstances, states do not fight against unruly parts of society by killing or destroying them. According to the recent COIN doctrine of the US Army, in counter-insurgency interventions the centre of gravity moves from killing an enemy to winning over significant parts of an opponent that is part of the wider population.9 This may, however, be different when states brand their opponents as terrorists.

Unlike interstate wars, insurgencies and COIN are mostly not about outright military victory; rather, they are about competition over the ability and right to govern specific territories and people. Governance enters the theoretical models describing insurgencies in three different ways. First, there is the insurgency itself, which by definition aims at reducing the reach of the governing state. In the geographical areas and social spaces they control, insurgencies are confronted with the task of replacing the governance functions of the state with alternative solutions.10 Often insurgencies mobilise and justify their violent actions with reference to failures in state governance provision and promise better alternatives.

Second, there is the counter-insurgency response to this governance challenge to the state: core governance functions in the fields of security, administration, and development should be provided more effectively and legitimately by the state than by the competitors to the state.11 Here governance is a core component of the population-centred ‘hearts-and-minds’ approach to COIN.

Third, all different approaches to COIN, including the treatment of an insurgency as a terrorist or criminal challenge, can lead to specific regimes of counter-insurgency governance, within and beyond the territory immediately affected by the insurgency. Counter-insurgency governance is a specific ‘securitised’ regime of state rule, defined by countering the insurgency threat.12 This may lead to de facto autonomy as in Chechnya, accepting high levels of
extrajudicial violence or contradictions with the federal law. It may also lead to accepting high levels of corruption, if this is used for funding counter-insurgency patronage networks or business interests of clients politically loyal to or dependent on the central state (elite formation as insurgency-threat related stabilisation strategy in Kabardino-Balkaria is an example).

Theoretical frames of the insurgency in the North Caucasus

Insurgency as a form of resistance against state rule has deep roots in the North Caucasus, from the wars against Russian imperial expansion in the south up to the present period. Different interpretations of what drives the insurgencies have turned into a discursive resource on all sides involved. Insurgencies have used ethno-national and religious identities for mobilisation and ideological support of their movements. At the same time, insurgencies have been influenced by the struggle of individual leaders and strategic groups for power and influence.

The following perspectives dominate the discussion on the nature of the insurgencies in the North Caucasus. According to one view popular with some intellectuals, the insurgencies are grievance-driven and the continuation of a national-liberation struggle started by Imam Shamil, the leader of the resistance struggle against czarist Russia in the nineteenth century. A critical analysis of this perspective is present in the work of V.A. Tishkov on Chechnya. The second point of view also sees the grounds for the insurgency in grievances of the population towards the state. Here the emphasis, however, is on social contradictions between elites close to the state and the wider society. The argument is that widespread corruption leads to aggravated social polarisation and poverty. Law enforcement agencies defend only the interests of the corrupt political elites. The authorities are using the slogan of the ‘global war against terror’ as a pretext to justify general repressive policies. Widespread repression in turn aggravates grievances and turns ordinary people against the state.

Other explanations underscore the important role of the economy, especially the oil sector in Chechnya, as fuelling the insurgency. One early explanation was that the insurgency comprised a conspiracy on the part of the state security forces to usher in large-scale military operations and so pave the way for the installation of an authoritarian regime in Russia. A theoretically more refined version of this argument is the ‘perverted reciprocity of violence’ argument. According to this position, state violence and violent popular resistance generate each other and are interdependent in organisational terms.

The problem with most of those explanations is that they tend to focus on one explanatory factor only and they fail to provide empirical evidence for this factor. We will show in the following case comparison that the insurgencies in the North Caucasus cannot be reduced to mono-causal explanations. They
derive from a number of intertwined politico-economic, sociopolitical, and ethno-cultural conditions. The role of charismatic individual leaders, who emerged with the break-up of the Soviet Union, adds additional historical idiosyncrasy to the phenomenon of insurgency governance.

**Method**

We take the contrasting though not mutually exclusive theoretical perspectives on what drives insurgencies – grievances of the people, greed of the leaders, or counter-measures of the state – as the starting point for our analysis of insurgency dynamics in the North Caucasus. We then ask how 25 years of insurgency and counter-insurgency measures have affected governance in this region. We analyse what patterns of governance have emerged and what implications they may have for sustainable political stability in the North Caucasus.

We do this by comparing insurgency and counter-insurgency dynamics in the republics of Chechnya, Dagestan, and Kabardino-Balkaria (Figure 1). The republics are similar in terms of their administrative status within the Russian Federation. This Federation consists of 85 subject peoples among which there are 22 national republics. Until 2004 the heads of the subnational subject peoples were elected; after this, until 2011 they were appointed by the president of the Russian Federation. Elections were reintroduced in 2012; the leaders of the North Caucasian republics requested, however, that the Federal Government abstain from conducting such elections – justifying this on the basis of the risk of triggering conflicts. The republics have their own constitutions and some degree of institutional autonomy.

Our cases are also similar in their socio-geographical structure, divided between fertile agricultural land and larger urban centres in the northern plains and highland villages, with a focus on livestock and subsistence agriculture in the mountainous south of the republics. All three republics border independent states of the South Caucasus (Georgia and Azerbaijan). The majority and titular ethnic groups in all three republics are (formally) Muslim, but there are sizeable (formal) Christian minorities present, mostly Orthodox Russians, and a small Jewish community.

The republics are different, however, in terms of the ethnic diversity. After the two post-Soviet wars, Chechnya is closest to a mono-ethnic republic among the three, while Dagestan is one of the most ethnically and linguistically diverse places in the region. Kabardino-Balkaria has the two titular groups plus a still sizeable Russian population.

The three republics are also very different in terms of the intensity and organisation of the respective insurgencies, and in terms of counter-measures taken by the state. Chechnya experienced two very different kinds of insurgencies: the first anti-imperial, aiming at national independence and secular state building; the second connecting to a broader Islamist ideology and aiming at building
an emirate in the North Caucasus – and two very violent counter-insurgency wars waged by the federal centre. Kabardino-Balkaria, at the other end of the scale, is subject to mostly latent pressure by some insurgency groups and has seen only a few large-scale violent confrontations. In Dagestan there has been a low intensity but persistent and well-organised insurgency continuing over the past two decades.

For comparative reasons we first present three brief historical narratives of the dynamics of insurgency and counter-insurgency followed by a structured analysis across the three cases. Based on the case comparison, we identify different patterns of governance that emerged from the dynamic relationship between insurgencies and counter-insurgency measures.

Case narratives

Chechnya

The beginnings of Chechen militancy (1990–1994)
The Chechen national congress, held 23–25 November 1990, led to the creation of the executive committee of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People (ACCP), headed by Djokhar Dudaev. The ACCP soon formed its own armed guard units. A high level of hidden unemployment facilitated recruitment into these brigades. The leading drivers of mobilisation were ideological and national-cultural factors: in the centre of discussion was the revaluation of history, in particular of the Chechen wars in the nineteenth century, and the Stalinist deportation of peoples.

First Chechen War (1994–1996)
The first open confrontations between the insurgency in Chechnya and federal forces took place in the mid-1990s. These first battles set an example to be emulated in other North Caucasian regions, primarily in Dagestan. The escalating fighting culminated in a full-scale intervention by Russian federal forces in December 1994, leading to tens of thousands of deaths, and even larger numbers of displaced persons. The indiscriminate violence of the military action destroyed the economy and social infrastructure of Chechnya. Mass unemployment was the result, which in turn provided a social basis for filling the ranks of the insurgency. Reprisals and punitive actions by the federal forces discredited the Russian army and further facilitated recruitment by insurgents. Attempts by federal forces to weaken Chechen mobilisation by promising concessions, such as an amnesty, or by forming a loyal government under Doku Zavgaev, did not yield the expected results and merely facilitated the formation of the Chechen insurgency.

The First Chechen War had further consequences, which were to change the dynamics of the conflict. Firstly, a large number of volunteers and mercenaries...
from the countries of the Middle East were drawn to Chechnya, leading to the emergence of religious radicalism and extremism. Secondly, a ‘war economy’ emerged, based on trade in prisoners, hostages, as well as arms, and drugs. This ‘market of violence’, once established, operated according to its own laws.

Temporary peace in Chechnya (1996–1999)
The First Chechen War ended with the signing of a peace agreement on 31 August 1996 in Khasavyurt. According to the Khasavyurt Agreement, Russian forces pulled out of Chechnya. Moreover, a decision on the status of the republic was to be reached within five years following the signing of the treaty. The signing of the Khasavyurt Agreement ushered in a phase of semi-independence for Chechnya. In these years, neither Russian laws nor Russian institutions operated on the territory of Chechnya, but extensive economic ties with Russia remained in place, including the transfer of subsidies from the federal budget.

The insurgency thus acquired formal legal status within the borders of the republic. Given the mass unemployment resulting from the wartime damage, only a small number of insurgents were able to return to civilian life. Some joined the newly organised ‘regular’ forces, who, however, tended to show more loyalty to their respective commanders than to the laws of the republic. A significant number of armed insurgents remained with their brigades, headed by field commanders who were not integrated in the new power structures, and who depended on armed raids and robbery for revenue. Other armed groups based on radical political Islamism emerged. During this phase, multiple parallel systems of power existed, both in the economy, in politics, and among the security forces, leading to a legal vacuum and the de-monopolisation of violence.

The Second Chechen War and counter-insurgency (1999 until present)
The starting point of this phase was marked by the incursion into Dagestan of brigades led by the field commanders Shamil Basaev and Khattab in August 1999. This ‘export’ of the organised insurgency marked the zenith of its growth and, at the same time, the start of its demise: the launch of a military operation by federal forces, the degradation of insurgency structures, and a significant reduction of its financial flows and arms supplies. But Moscow’s main success came through exploiting divisions in the ranks of the insurgency: by winning over opponents such as the Yamadaev brothers who controlled Gudermes, and most importantly, by co-opting the spiritual leader of the Chechen Muslims, Akhmat Kadyrov, an adherent of the traditionally dominant version of Islam. As part of his deal with Russia, on 12 June 2000 Akhmat Kadyrov was appointed head of the Chechen administration.

Loyal traditionalism, both in terms of selected Sufi brotherhoods as well as selected teips (tribes), has since been the backbone of federal power in Chechnya. This was the start of the phase of active ‘Chechenisation’ of the counter-insurgency. The Chechens’ methods being more flexible and locally
informed than those of the federal forces, made it easier for them to repress non-coopted insurgent structures.36

After 2002, the insurgency fragmented further with its official structures destroyed and the remnants forced underground (‘into the woods’). The federal government, headed by Vladimir Putin, now branded the insurgents as ‘terrorists’. Counter-insurgency henceforth focused on eliminating the leaders of the insurgency. In 2005, the former president of Ichkeriya, Aslan Maskhadov, was killed, followed in 2006 by Shamil Basaev, a crucial commander and ideological leader of the insurgency. The spectrum of counter-insurgency measures implemented ranged from co-opting local leaders to taking hostages from among the relatives of insurgent fighters.37 Law enforcement institutions reappeared and integrated amnestied fighters. The appointment of Ramzan Kadyrov, a former insurgent fighter and son of Ahmad Kadyrov (assassinated by insurgents in 2004) as president in 2007 triggered a wave of defections from the insurgency to the side of the new authorities.

**Dagestan**

In Dagestan, the insurgency emerged much more slowly than in Chechnya. Dagestan is a multi-ethnic region, comprising more than 40 different ethnic groups, 14 of which are so-called titular nationalities.38 Traditionally and specific for Dagestan, this diverse and fragmented society organised in the form of kinship and locality based *dzhamaats*, institutionalising the social life within the local community and representing it politically to the outside.39 The development of the insurgency was marked by a number of stages linked to some extent to events in Chechnya.40


Unlike Chechnya, the collapse of the USSR in Dagestan only triggered a short surge in support for national liberation that quickly subsided again. Most of the ethnic groups reacted negatively to the idea of separation from Russia, worried about the risk of losing their status or of unchecked political domination by the two largest ethnic groups, the Avars and the Dargins. In 1994, Dagestan’s new constitution guaranteed proportional representation for the ethnic groups in the region’s executive and parliament. The growth of some inter-ethnic disputes did not directly connect to the insurgency, but the absence of effective mechanisms for resolution of these and other conflicts between different identity groups did gradually weaken confidence in the state.
The period of active and legal growth of radical Islamic organisations (1993–1997)

Radical political Islam\(^{41}\) began to spread in Dagestan in the late 1980s,\(^{42}\) possibly even earlier.\(^{43}\) However, for some years, it remained within the shadow of traditional Islam and ethno-cultural movements. Gradually, radical attitudes began to spread among young people.\(^{44}\) This was exacerbated by dramatic changes in socio-economic conditions. In the North Caucasian republics, industrial production fell sharply; in the towns and villages, the number of unemployed soared and marginalised sections of society swelled; discontent with the leadership grew, fuelled by the perceived corruption of these elites. Dagestani youth, left without any chance of integration into social and economic life, increasingly volunteered to fight for the Chechen insurgency and went to train in camps in Chechnya.

The formative period of the Dagestan insurgency and of the Islamist enclave in the Kadarskaya zone (1997–2001)

For many Dagestani extremists who took part in the Russian–Chechen war in 1994–1996 on the side of Dudayev, Maskhadov’s Chechnya became a factor of political mobilisation in the struggle for power in Dagestan. This group of Dagestanis sought to establish spiritual authority in Dagestan based on the principles of sharia. In 1996–1997, the first organised cells of radical Islamism appeared in Dagestan – in the Buynaksk, Kazbek, and Tsumada areas. The Salafist movement connected to the social institution of *dzhamaat*, reinterpreting it as religious community organisations or shuras (councils), and referred to their organisation as *dzhamaat al-muslimii*.\(^{45}\)

A unique example of this was the creation of the Kadar enclave in upper Dagestan, Buynaksk District. Here Islamists established a de facto autonomous territory with sharia law in 1998–1999. Geographical factors may have played a role: isolated mountain valleys with favourable climatic conditions for subsistence agriculture provided shelter from easy state access. However, at the heart of the Salafist autonomous enclave lay a local insurgency governance with a high level of solidarity and significant support from the local community. The notion of social order based on ‘pure Islam’ in the Kadar zone attracted young people from all over Dagestan. On 15 August 1998, the Islamists expelled the local administration from Karamahi, closed police stations, and set up armed checkpoints at the entrance to the towns in the Kadar zone. Rebel checkpoints were marked with green Islamic flags, displaying signs in Russian and Arabic: ‘You are entering a territory governed by Sharia law.’\(^{46}\) Islamists announced the creation of a ‘separate Islamic territory’ in the Kadar zone.\(^{47}\)

The incursion of Basaev and Khattab in the summer of 1999 spelled the end of the enclave. Most Dagestani communities took sides against Basaev’s fighters (under whose command were some representatives of the Kadar enclave). The Chechen units retreated to Chechnya. Afterwards, in August, the federal security
forces launched military operations against the enclave. By 12 September 1999 the enclave fell and a large number of fighters fled to the mountains, while government forces combed the settlements for remaining insurgents.

**The insurgency goes underground (2001 until present)**
The end of the Second Chechen War, in 2001–2002, marked a new stage in Dagestan, where the Dagestan underground insurgency opted for asymmetric methods of fighting (hit-and-run attacks, IEDs, suicide attacks), as was the case in Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria. The underground insurgency relied on radical Salafi ideology, rejecting what they saw as a ‘corrupt state’, but often collaborating with black-market structures in the pursuit of economic interests.48

**Kabardino-Balkaria**
Kabardino-Balkaria is a small mountainous republic in the central Caucasus, inhabited by three main ethnic groups:49 Kabardinians (57%), Russians (22%), and Balkars (13%). The Kabardinians and Balkars have different languages, and are engaged in a competition over land and the distribution of key posts in the regional administration. The development of the insurgency in this republic is marked by three main periods.

**Latent tensions between ethnic groups (1990–1997)**
Pre-existing conflicts in the Kabardino-Balkarian Republic (KBR) mostly related to access to and distribution of resources with the media playing an important role in heating up the tense situation – as did the escalating violence in Chechnya. However, apart from small local disputes, sometimes growing into stand-offs between groups of villages, there were no large-scale conflicts. Power in the republic continued to be highly centralised, and newly founded democratic institutions came under pressure. Nevertheless, the republic counted as an example of political stability in the North Caucasus. This contrasted with increasing social tensions: unemployment, especially among youth, corruption, clientelistic relationships governing access to social benefits (jobs, access to universities, healthcare), and growing inequality between different social groups. The Russian-speaking population began to migrate from the republic – not because of the threat of instability and violence (as was the case in Chechnya), but because of the lack of jobs and hardships as a result of the bad economic situation.50 The biggest threat to stability in the republic was posed by corruption and economic decline.51

The continual decline in the effectiveness of the state at all levels created the conditions for the insurgency to emerge. Hardest hit were young people, who felt victimised by socio-economic injustices and perceived obstacles to career
opportunities. Confronted with a (even in relative terms) highly corrupt and materialist governing elite, young people increasingly turned to religion as an alternative system of prestige, but soon felt discriminated against for doing so.\textsuperscript{52} In addition to local returnees from more radical Islamic schools abroad, Islamist propaganda from the eastern Caucasus (Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia) provided an ideological foundation for radically minded youth in Kabardino-Balkaria.\textsuperscript{53} They formed informal \textit{dzhamaats} (here: religious communities) that became an alternative to traditional Islam and were initially tolerated by the state.\textsuperscript{54} The KBR \textit{Dzhamaat} integrated these local \textit{dzhamaats} at republican level. It attracted mostly young believers striving towards ‘pure’ Islam devoid of the folk traditions and rites.\textsuperscript{55} Young Muslims belonging to the \textit{Dzhamaat} and opposing the official communities in the republic were labelled ‘Wahhabis’, although they called themselves simply ‘Muslims following “pure” Islam’.\textsuperscript{56}

Many leaders of \textit{dzhamaats}, referred to as ‘emirs’, had close ties to the leaders of Muslim radicals in Dagestan and Chechnya. The second war in Chechnya (beginning in 1999) and the start of a large-scale offensive against ‘terrorists’ spilled over into Kabardino-Balkaria as well, where both Muslim radicals and other young Muslim faithful frequently visited mosques: external signifiers like wearing beards became the focus of suspicion. Law enforcement bodies compiled so-called ‘Wahhabi’ lists of suspects, obstructed visits to prayer houses, closed mosques, hindered the distribution of religious materials, and conducted illegal searches, arrests, and torture. Discriminative and repressive profiling by the authorities turned into a major grievance for Muslim believers in this republic.\textsuperscript{57}

\textbf{Escalation of insurgency (2005 until present)}

Reportedly, on 13 October 2005, 217 armed insurgents attacked security forces in Nalchik. According to official statistics, in the course of the two days of fighting, 92 insurgents, 35 law enforcement officers, and 14 civilians died.\textsuperscript{58} These events came as a complete surprise to the law enforcement agencies and citizens of the republic.

A large number of the fighters belonged to the KBR \textit{Dzhamaat}, prohibited in 2005, and its leaders put on wanted lists. From this time on, both terrorism against the state and counter-terrorist operations became a frequent phenomenon in Kabardino-Balkaria.

\textbf{Comparative case analysis}

\textbf{Actors and their organisations}

Initially, the break-up of the Soviet Union left similar constellations of relevant actors in all three republics: leaders of the national movements for self-determination, flanked by entrepreneurs of violence emerging from the ranks of
bureaucrats and from organised crime and opposed by former Soviet party functionaries afraid of losing power and influence. Only in Chechnya, with one titular nationality and a charismatic nationalist leader of all-soviet proportions (General Dzhokhar Dudaev), did this develop into a national movement willing and able to aim for independence. In contrast, in ethnically divided Kabardino-Balkaria and ethnically fractious Dagestan the national movements did not develop into dominant actors challenging the post-soviet state.

During the First Chechen War, field commanders such as Shamil Basaev, Ruslan Gelaev, and Arbi Baraev acquired significance. Almost all field commanders subsequently received important posts in Maskhadov’s post-war government. However, their lack of professionalism in civilian governance paired with internal feuding became emblematic for the failure of this government. Also in terms of loyalty, the appointment of former rebel leaders proved to be counterproductive. Most of the commanders eventually became Maskhadov’s political opponents, forming a new military and religious opposition. Foreign mercenaries introduced radical Salafism (at that time referred to as Wahhabism), discrediting traditional Islam. The Salafists created parallel military and political structures, and refused to subordinate themselves to official public bodies. After the Khasavyurt peace accord, Maskhadov increasingly lost control over the republic to the more radical Salafi commanders. In response to this trend, the Mufti of the Muslims of Chechnya, Ahmad Kadyrov, summoned a Congress of the Muslims of the North Caucasus in Grozny 1998, expressing opposition to the infiltration of Chechnya by ‘Wahhabis’. As a result, Islamism split the Chechen insurgency.59

Unlike Chechnya, the much weaker insurgency in Dagestan was based on radical Islamist ideologists from the start. During the mid-1990s established political entrepreneurs increasingly instrumentalised Islam for political goals. Like Chechnya, though with little resistance from the traditional religious groups, foreign Islamist missionaries also played an important role. However, the most relevant competition between political entrepreneurs in Dagestan was not insurgency related: rather, leaders with prestige within their respective ethnic group used the established ethnic quota system as a springboard to attain political or administrative office. In the 1990s, a semi-official system of ethno-political patronage emerged to represent and negotiate the different interests of elites and their clients. In terms of elite dynamics this ethnic diversity and institutionalised competition has been the characteristic difference between post-soviet Dagestan and the other republics of this study.

Until the First Chechen War, in Kabardino-Balkaria leaders of ethno-national movements played a significant oppositional role. The bi-ethnic political constellation of Kabardinians and Balkarians threatened to escalate into an open conflict over access to state positions and control over territory. However, attempts by ethno-political entrepreneurs to divide the republic along ethnic lines failed. The presidency of Valeriy Kokov is credited with containing anticipated inter-ethnic
conflicts. Like Dagestan, Kokov established an informal system of co-opting leaders of ethnic movements into the system via unwritten quota regulations. Less visible than in Chechnya and Dagestan, also in Kabardino-Balkaria new social actors emerged gradually who built their power not on ethnic but rather on religious mobilisation. They included former students who had been educated abroad and organised around the KBR Dzhamaat in opposition to the state-controlled Spiritual Directorate of Muslims.

In the Second Chechen War, federal forces destroyed the insurgents' Republic of Ichkeria and consolidated their gains by building on a specific counter-insurgency strategy, namely by gradually handing over security control to local militias consisting of turn-around former insurgents. In charge of the gradual Chechenisation of the conflict were successively Ahmed and then his son Ramzan Kadyrov. Similar to Maskhadov, both Kadyrovs filled top posts with influential field commanders whom they considered loyal. The main difference was that the Kadyrovs enjoyed the Kremlin's full backing in appointing and dismissing officials. They stood at the centre of multiple networks of subordinate patrons. By physically eliminating rivals, Ramzan Kadyrov became the single 'super patron' in the Republic, who had direct protection from the Russian president within the emerging system of hybrid vertical rule or 'sovereign democracy'.

This specific approach to pacification in Chechnya, i.e. empowering a significant part of the Chechen insurgency to become anti-insurgent warlords with federal backing, had a strong effect on insurgency dynamics in neighbouring Dagestan. The older generation that had been organisationally and ideologically dependent on the 'insurgency central' of Chechnya, was killed or imprisoned and younger people took over as leaders. Owing to law enforcement pressure, this new generation operated as underground insurgency. News of the capture or killing of emirs – leaders of dzhamaats (here: informal organisations of Muslim communities) – became standard fare in the news and on Internet portals. While the state executive increased its presence as security actor somewhat, institutional state penetration remained weak in Dagestan: on the local level, imams and mullahs remained an accepted part of local politics with politicians actively seeking their advice. In some regions of Dagestan, the imam of the district has developed into a key member of the political leadership with some functional similarity to the deputy secretary of the district communist party committee on ideological questions in Soviet times:

The district Imam is involved in consideration of the district's most important problems. He enjoys authority among the district's population that helps when implementing even unpopular decisions taken by the local authorities.

The remnants of the Chechen underground insurgency also played an important role in the emerging insurgency movement of Kabardino-Balkaria. Armed groups, like the group of Anzor Atabiev, the group of the brothers Bekkaev, the group of Zaurkan Shogenov, and the Yarmuk Dzhamaat, received support from the Chechen insurgency. However, it was the pressure from the law
enforcement agencies that gradually pushed the KBR Dzhamaat underground. The relationship between the Dzhamaat and the security forces had been tense even before it was outlawed as a terrorist organisation in 2005. The police closely monitored clerics at mosques and put administrative pressure on believers. It was at this time that the mass defection of religious Muslim youth to the underground insurgency started. After the violent events of 2005, the security forces played an ever larger role in the politics of the region. The manipulation of violence became a shortcut for solving certain political problems, which would have been complicated to resolve legally. Declaring a regime of anti-terror operations in mountain resorts, for instance, was allegedly also used to covertly redistribute land and real estate in that highly lucrative region.

The regional authorities have introduced a counter-insurgency regime, in order to provoke the fall of land prices and force the population of the region to sell the land. But the population did not give in, although it was hard, especially those who took out loans.

**Resources**

Only in Chechnya did the insurgency aim at and temporarily succeed in taking over many assets of the state. This initially focused on revenues from extraction and refining of oil, sale of arms, and money embezzled from federal transfers aimed at rebuilding the struggling economy. Supplies flowed in via the almost entirely uncontrolled air connection (Grozny had an international airport between 1990 and 1994). The shuttle trade economy was based on goods imported from abroad free of federal taxes and customs, which were sold across the whole of the Northern Caucasus.

During the First Chechen War, the insurgency resource base was built on hostage ransoms, duty-free trade in a wide range of goods, and the shadow market in weapons. During this phase, information became a key resource given the propaganda campaign raging on both sides. Chechen media captured a certain segment of the information market, ensuring not only regional and international awareness, but also increasing material support for their cause.

At the time of the ‘Maskhadov republic’, Chechnya exploited the ambiguity of its position between political independence and being formally part of Russia. Russia supplied electric power, gas, and pension payments. Oil continued to generate large revenues, mostly from refining oil imported from outside of Chechnya. Attempts to organise a unitary state company, Grozneft, subordinated to Maskhadov’s government, caused a sharp increase in tension between Moscow and Chechnya.

During the Second Chechen War, Moscow stemmed the flow of recruits by offering Chechens highly paid work in the security structures. Monitoring financial flows and interdicting arms shipments strangled the supplies of the insurgency.
Control over the financial flows in post-war Chechnya had a significant impact on preventing financing the rebels. I must admit, however, that even a lack of funding is not sufficient to counter the recruitment of young people into the insurgency for ideological and extremely religious reasons.67

The new leaders, i.e. Kadyrov and his supporters, many of whom were themselves former insurgents, received hitherto unheard-of powers and resources, flowing straight from Moscow in the form of central subsidies.68

Contrary to the impression that the new bureaucracy is interested in the existence of the insurgency in order to lobby for funds from Moscow, recent events show that the leadership has found a new way of attracting investments – by promoting the image of a peaceful republic with no insurgency.69

After the war, Kadyrov developed a legal framework to facilitate the spending of vast sums for a programme to rebuild Chechnya (e.g. Akhmat Kadyrov Fond). These financial flows gave birth to a class of bureaucrats and embezzlers who had a stake in the implementation of the programme and the continued flow of money.

In Dagestan the insurgency never came close to capturing the state. Here, competition for limited economic resources between strategic political groups remained a main aspect influencing the insurgency. Land, fish and caviar from the Caspian Sea, and oil in the north of Dagestan comprise its material base. Access to markets and goods from Azerbaijan and also, in 1990–1994, goods from the Grozny outdoor market (imported duty-free from abroad) also played an important role, as later did budget funds transferred from Moscow for social and economic projects. Criminal groups competed for these resources. The quota system entrenched ethnic belonging as a resource to access administrative positions and political power. Subordinate positions are not merely distributed via ethnic clientelism, but also on a black market where state positions can be bought for money.

Having money, you can arrange for a relative to gain employment in the police, in a school, or at University. And it doesn't matter what your nationality is; it is [only] important to have money. But the positions in state structures with high responsibilities are distributed among a narrow circle of relatives and friends who as a rule belong to the same ethnic group.70

This deeply corrupt system, accessible only to the established ethnic leaders and their clients, has been a major grievance among those who did not belong to these circles. Hence, and for different reasons than in Chechnya, the most important non-material resource for the insurgency became information in form of a religious moral discourse on the corruption of the official system. In this sense, mosques became important centres for the distribution of non-state-controlled information.

Like Dagestan, in Kabardino-Balkaria, access to material resources and economic opportunities is closely controlled by politically established patron–client networks, blocking access for those vast parts of society that do not belong to
the such networks. Hence, moral discourses on the corrupt and inaccessible official system grew into an important resource for the domestic insurgency. The rapid increase in the number of mosques in Kabardino-Balkaria generated a large increase in the number of clerical leaders. However, the funds generated to build mosques in turn generated their own shadow networks of corruption.

In addition, the role of the underground Dzhamaat became functionally important both for criminals as well as for the security forces. In the name of the Dzhamaat, criminals ran rackets extorting funds from shops selling spirits (Kabardino-Balkaria owns distilleries using locally produced grains). After 2005, strong suspicion emerged that the insurgency had come to be susceptible to manipulation by the security establishment in order to further increase their influence.

In terms of the relationship of the different federal subjects to the resource-providing centre, the strategies differ: In the case of Chechnya, it is beneficial to ‘sugar-coat’ the brutal results of suppressing the insurgency. In the case of KBR, it pays to portray the situation as very tense, in order to win more development funds from the state budget. In Dagestan, the internal governance situation is even more fluid and less controlled than in the other two republics. As a result, while the resource dependency of the governing elites is huge and Moscow on occasion has the power to directly intervene with the local elites, no specific strategic relationship with the centre has emerged yet.

**Institutions**

The collapse of the Soviet Union questioned the institutional order in all three republics. This institutional crisis, however, played out differently and had different consequences. In Chechnya, as in the other two cases, Soviet-era institutions initially continued to regulate life in the republic, even after the declaration of independence. Chechnya remained dependent on many federal institutions. This changed only with the First Chechen War and the introduction of insurgency governance.

During the phase of military operations, many formal state institutions vanished. Traditional institutions based on kinship and tribal ties as well as traditional Sufi brotherhood organisation acquired more significance in the provision of local governance functions. Every settlement formed self-defence brigades, and, in some cases, civil mediators for holding talks both with the armed forces as well as with rebel fighters.

At the same time, new rules won traction in response to the spread of common violence and lawlessness that had resulted from the first war between insurgents and Russian federal forces. Conscious of the growing influence of radical Salafist commanders, President Maskhadov gradually introduced sharia norms to the legal system. In early 1999, Maskhadov issued a decree introducing full sharia rule to Ichkeria. These concessions failed, however, to end competition
between different systems of governance in the republic. The Second Chechen War subsequently destroyed those weak institutional innovations again.

Some more traditional informal local institutions, however, adapted and survived. The engagement of diverse actors in the framework of the teips (tribes) and Sufi brotherhoods connected sections of Chechen society, who have chosen the Kadyrov Clan for patronage, to the Russian state (at the level of the Republic; loyalty to the federal state is a different question). Strategically reinvented ‘traditional’ local institutions became a key resource first in the counter-insurgency, then in the formation of a new system of governance.

Traditional institutions (teips and Sufi brotherhoods) have great potential for peace-building that has not yet been fully exploited. I believe that the republic’s leadership, by drawing on the traditional institutions of Chechen society, has identified a fitting set of counter insurgency tools.75

Under Ramzan Kadyrov’s rule, a hybrid post-insurgency system of governance emerged. It was built on the selective incorporation of former insurgents and a high degree of political autonomy from Russian state rule while at the same time making the acknowledgement of the personal authority and patronage of the Russian president an integral part of post-war political stability in Chechnya. Unlike Chechnya, in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria the core institutions that emerged in post-Soviet times have remained largely stable. These comprise primarily the administrative-territorial division, which assigns districts to different ethnic groups, and also the quota system for ethnic groups in parliament and the government. In Dagestan this system is formalised: the constitution guarantees each ethnic group proportional representation in state bodies. To some extent, this has balanced the inter-ethnic power struggle, allowing the stability of the republic to be maintained by preventing any one ethnic group from dictating rules to the others or monopolising power. However, state penetration down to the local level both in terms of service delivery as well as compliance with state rules is weak. The weakness of state institutions has led traditional informal local institutions to gain strength locally within some groups.76

In Dagestan the most influential traditional institution on the local level is the dzhamaat. Traditionally, the Daghestani dzhamaat was a local community institution, closely connected to the life of the respective individual localities. More recently, the dzhamaat came to be associated with the religious life of the local community (this was the version that then spread throughout the North Caucasus). The internal cohesion among the members of the old dzhamaat system made it a springboard for political leaders and organisations.77

As a consequence of the Chechen wars, the religious component of dzhamaats moved to the fore and some became centres of the underground insurgency, accumulating resources and recruiting youth. Violent Islamists drew on dzhamaat structures to organise their movement and increase their impact on local society.78 This caused sustained tensions between the more traditional
institution organising local communities and the ideologically charged Islamist version of the *dzhamaat*.

An important institution regulating life within but also beyond the *dzhamaats* became sharia. It compensates for the obvious deficiencies of the formal state institutions in regulating everyday disputes.

If in institutional terms today Chechnya is a case of a strong and repressive ‘local’ state controlling a society with relatively strong local institutions and Dagestan is a case of superficial state rule over strong and diverse communities, then Kabardino-Balkaria is a case of a repressive state ruling over weakly constituted communities. This was not always the case. During the Kokov presidency (1992–2005) hybrid (semi-official) institutions emerged in Kabardino-Balkaria that successfully regulated conflicts over key resources. The system of ethnic representation used an informal quota system first developed in late Soviet times.

However, towards the end of the Kokov presidency, the system of ethnic representation started to change. The number of positions occupied by Russian-speakers declined. The Balkar share increased. After Kokov’s death, Kanokov, an oligarch, took power, and the system of ethnic representation collapsed. The economic interests of, and loyalty to, the president became the dominant factor in deciding access to administrative resources. Access to power and economic resources became vertically integrated and arbitrarily controlled by one clan (that of Kanokov) rather than by any distributive principle.

The insurgency itself is inter-ethnic in composition. Kanokov’s moves towards monopolisation of the economy led to growth in discontent among competitors, indirectly fuelling the insurgency. The attacks by insurgents increasingly resembled operations planned to discredit the authorities. The insurgency in Kabardino-Balkaria connected to the Islamic *dzhamaat* structure, which was, unlike in Dagestan, an institutional innovation here. The KBR *Dzhamaat* had three organisational levels – republic, district, and settlement – led by a shura of emirs. Sharia courts were introduced for the resolution of disputes. These new institutional structures offered a high level of mobilisation and solidarity among its members. This attracted young religious people in large numbers before the *Dzhamaat* was outlawed and went underground in 2005.

In institutional terms the securitisation of governance in response to insurgencies in the North Caucasus has to be seen in the wider context of a political transformation in Russia towards an autocratic oppressive model with strict centralisation of power. Under Putin, the state reacted to the insurgency challenge by centralising its power, integrating the North Caucasus regions into the Southern Federal district in 2000, with its administrative centre in Rostov-on-Don, followed in 2010 by the North Caucasus Federal District, centred in Pyatigorsk. On 12 May 2014, the president of the Russian Federation formed a special ministry for the North Caucasus, the main task of which is to solve economic tasks in the region.
Governance patterns

In this last section, and based on the discussion of similarities and differences across the three cases, we return to the question of what insurgency-informed governance patterns have emerged and what explains the differences in terms of who governs how in interaction with an insurgency.

Chechnya makes the first case. We call this pattern GOS-Insurgency. GOS-Insurgency is the case of the federal state using internal divisions within an insurgency that succeeded in capturing the state locally to govern part of the state territory, not to defeat it but to establish proxy control over that territory. This is done by co-opting powerful and well-organised actors of the insurgency and empowering them to control the territory and govern on behalf of this state. Extra-legal protection of the co-opted and empowered part of the insurgency by the leader of the federal state and a sustained flow of material resources as club-goods are constitutive parts of the GOS-Insurgency governance pattern. In return for a high degree of de facto autonomy of the co-opted local leaders and the services provided to them, the federal government receives personalised loyalty and dependence of a local regime consisting of former commanders and their militias that have the local knowledge and resources to suppress all resistance.

GOS-Insurgency almost became a trademark of Putin’s counter-insurgency/terrorist approach and an integral – some argue even constitutive – part of the Kremlin’s concept of sovereign democracy. This arrangement has, however, systemic risks. Federal institutional control is a fiction and the loyalty of the leadership depends on personal patronage and resource flows. The power and resources of the local political elites can easily turn against the federal state if the relationship of personal patronage ends. At the same time, the informal and personalised nature of the relationship between the federal and republican governments exposes institutional weaknesses of the state as such and may alienate political actors attached to those exposed institutions – first and foremost, the powerful federal security bodies.

The governance pattern that emerged in Dagestan is very different and seems less suited as trademark for a decisive and successful counter-insurgency strategy. Here, an institutionally weak subnational government deals with a fragmented but institutionally strong society. The relationship between community leaders and the state and the administrative as well as material resources distributed are regulated mostly via a semi-formalised political institution of ethnic quotas and resulting patronage. As in all three patterns of governance identified here, federal transfers of resources are critical to stabilising society–state relations in Dagestan. There is some low-level yet persistent insurgency pressure, targeting what it perceives as a corrupt and dysfunctional system of governance. However, it seems that it is this semi-formal relationship between a weak but distributive state and strong local communities that keeps insurgency
pressure in check and reduces effective state oppression like in Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria.

This governance pattern seems fragile but may be most adapted to a situation in which institutionally weak statehood is there for the long term and the compliance of communities is achieved by finding local solutions to critical questions of legitimacy, inclusiveness, and sustainability of governance. Governance in Dagestan has adapted to some of the challenges it faced over the past two decades.

The Kabardino-Balkarian Republic is, perhaps, the most typical case of insurgency-affected (or, more generally, challenged) state rule in contemporary Russia. We would call it – with little overstatement – governance by corruption, with force as a fall-back option. Here the federal state feels strong enough to govern via completely dependent appointed proxies with little or no local power base to speak of. Society is weak and poses little threat to the established elite. Occasional challenges in the form of real or staged insurgency attacks are met by the forces of the Ministry of Interior and – in rare exceptions – military force.

In none of the above cases has the state been able to deal effectively with the causes of the spread of radical elements in society. The securitisation of governance in response to insurgencies in the North Caucasus has to be seen in the wider context of a political transformation in Russia towards an autocratic oppressive model with strict centralisation of power. The future relationship between insurgency and counter-insurgency will depend on how Russia’s current systemic difficulties develop. The price demanded by local elites for their loyalty might increase, leading to concessions being made to regional elites, and the incorporation of new actors wielding influence over the insurgency structures.

Notes

2. Long, On ‘Other War’.
3. US Department of the Army FM3-24/MCWP 3-33.5.
7. Capacities, the preferences, and organisational ‘culture’ of armies and political establishments also matter (cf. Avant, Political Institutions).
8. See Gompert and Gordon, War by Other Means, 1–13 for a differentiation between GWOT and COIN; see Huérou et al., ‘Introduction’, 3–4 on Moscow’s definitions of the operations in Chechnya.
15. Gakaev and landarov, *Chechnia*.
17. Kolosov and Sebentcov, ‘Severnyi Kavkaz’.
22. Official statistics show that each year 120,000 Chechens were migrating to central Russia, Siberia, and other regions in search of work (Alkhazurov, *Stanovlenie i razvitie*).
23. Tishkov, *Obshchestvo*.
25. Alkhazurov, *Stanovlenie i razvitie*.
28. For the concept of markets of violence developing as a possible consequence of state failures, insurgencies, and civil wars, see Elwert, ‘Markets of Violence’.
31. Alkhazurov, *Stanovlenie i razvitie*.
32. The brand of radical political Islam that spread in the North Caucasus in the second half of the 1990s and increasingly influenced the insurgency draws on a brand of Salafist doctrine. Since these ideas entered the region mostly via people who were trained at Wahhabi religious schools (i.e. Madrassas under Saudi influence) most Russian writers refer to radical political Islamist movements generally as Wahhabism. Neither Salafism nor the teachings of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab as part of the ‘purifying’ Salafi movement in Islam are per se prone to violent Islamism. Salafism did, however, produce some influential and radical thinkers that produced the ideological basis of many jihadist groups today (see Schaefer, *The Insurgency in Chechnya*, 150–2).
34. Sufism rather than Salafism or Wahhabism, see Ibid.
35. Malashenko, *Ramzan Kadyrov*.
36. Lyall, ‘Ethnicity and Insurgent Violence’.
38. Anikanov et al., *Titulnye etnosy Rossiiskoi Federacii*.
41. See note 32.
45. Ibid., 80.
46. Lukin, ‘Iz tcikla ‘Noveishaia istoriia’.
47. Markedonov, ‘Terrorizm’.
48. Sokolov, ‘Islam protiv globalnogo rynka?’
49. Demoskop Weekly, *Vserossiiskaia perepis naseleniia*.
50. Shogenov and Menshikova, ‘Konkurenzia’.
53. According to Ratelle (Ibid., 189) one important difference was that young people from Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan but less so from Chechnya (because of the wars) travelled to Arabian countries and studied in Salafi madrassas. There contacts with the international Salafi movements intensified. According to Zhukov (‘Kabardino-Balkariia’) about 100 students left Kabardino-Balkaria in the early 1990s to study in foreign madrasas.
54. According to Vatchagaev (‘Sufism in Chechnya’, 223), unlike in Chechnya and Dagestan, traditional Islam in Kabardino-Balkaria was not institutionalised around Sufism and brotherhoods but was more mainstream Sunni.
55. Gaunova, ‘Effekt leiblinga’.
59. Malashenko, Ramzan Kadyrov.
61. Interview with a representative of the Botlih district administration, Botlih, June 2014.
63. Interview with representative of the local administration of the village of Elbrus, Summer 2013.
64. Ivanov, ‘Partiia voiny’.
65. Alkhazurov, Stanovlenie i razvitie.
66. Interview with M., see above.
67. Interview with Isa Bautdinov, former member of Dudaev’s and then Akhmat Kadyrov’s government, February 2015, Grozny.
68. Chechnya has received enormous financial transfers and seen the creation of special economic zones. The volume of subsidies received compared to taxes collected in 2007 was 433% for Chechnya, compared to 173% in Dagestan and 10% in Krasnodar territory (Malashenko, Ramzan Kadyrov).
69. Interview with Isa Bautdinov, February, 2015.
70. Interview with S.M., university teacher, Mai 2013, Makhachkala.
72. E.g. the scandal about the municipal mosque in Nalchik, see Zhukov, ‘Kabardino-Balkariia’.
73. According to Memorial, there was widespread belief in 2010–2011 that ‘the escalation of terror benefits and might even be organised by the authorities in order to clear the territory to make way for a tourist cluster involving huge investments’ (p. 21; http://www.memo.ru/uploads/files/562.pdf). According to some authors, the insurgency was dragged into the struggle for power between elites (Shtokolov, ‘Kavkayskie voiny’).
74. Alkhazurov, Stanovlenie i razvitie.
75. Interview with Isa Bautdinov, Deputy Minister of Economy in Dudyayev’s Government, February 2015.
77. Zürcher, The Post-Soviet Wars; Ware et al., ‘Democratization in Dagestan’.
78. Kisriev, Islam v Dagestane.
79. GOS is a widely used abbreviation for state in Russian.
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